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New York City patrolmen Waverly Jones and Joseph A. Piagentini 
seemed like police partners from a Hollywood movie: Jones, a thirty-
three-year old African-American, lived in the Bronx, while Piagentini, 
twenty-eight and white, grew up in Long Island.  Both had graduated 
from the same Police Academy class and joined the force on the same 
                                                          
     ∗ Roger Clegg (JD, Yale Law School, 1981; AB, Rice University, 1977) is vice presi-
dent and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Sterling, Virginia.  
George T. Conway III (JD, Yale Law School, 1987; AB, Harvard University, 1984) is a 
partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.  Kenneth K. Lee (JD, Harvard Law School, 
2000; AB, Cornell University, 1997) is an associate also at Wachtell Lipton.  The au-
thors submitted an amici brief on behalf of three family members of Joseph A. 
Piagentini, the Center for Equal Opportunity, and the Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion in the Muntaqim v. Coombe Second Circuit en banc appeal.  Many of the argu-
ments set forth in this article were presented in that amici brief. 
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day, and were assigned to the same squad car.  And they would die 
together on the streets of Harlem on the same warm spring evening 
in 1971.1 
After responding to a domestic violence call at a housing project, 
Jones and Piagentini were walking back to their car when Anthony 
Bottom and an accomplice snuck up behind them and began 
shooting at point-blank range.  Jones was dead before he hit the 
ground, .45-caliber slugs having ripped through his skull, his spine, 
his diaphragm, and one of his kidneys.  One of the gunmen shot 
Piagentini several times with a long-barreled .38 and continued to fire 
as the officer lay writhing on the ground.  When the gun ran out of 
bullets, Piagentini was still alive.  So his assailant grabbed Piagentini’s 
loaded service revolver and fired it at him until that weapon, too, was 
empty.  Patrolman Piagentini died on the way to Harlem Hospital.2 
A New York County jury convicted Bottom on two counts of murder 
in the first degree.  At trial, Bottom and his co-defendants declared 
that “they were at war with the United States.”3  Bottom received two 
concurrent prison terms of twenty-five years to life, and he has since 
been denied parole.  While incarcerated in an upstate New York 
prison, Bottom has waged an eleven-year legal battle challenging New 
York’s felon disenfranchisement statute on the ground that its alleged 
discriminatory effect on racial minorities violates the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (“VRA”).  In 2002, a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
Bottom’s claim that he has the right to vote while incarcerated.4  The 
Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court 
then denied his writ of certiorari.  In a highly unusual action after the 
denial of certiorari, however, the Second Circuit granted an en banc 
hearing, and oral arguments were heard in June 2004.5  Legal 
observers again expect a very close vote, noting that the Second 
Circuit en banc panel had previously split five-five on this very same 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., [Two] Slain Patrolmen Joined Department on Same Day, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 1971, at 57. 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, [Two] Policemen Slain by Shots in Back; [Two] 
Men Are Sought, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1971, at 1; ROBERT K. TANENBAUM & PHILIP 
ROSENBERG, BADGE OF THE ASSASSIN 3-5 (E.P. Dutton ed., 1979); Former Black Pan-
thers Lose Bid to Vacate 1975 Murder Convictions: People v. Bell, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 
1998, at 25 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998). 
 3. Marvine Howe, [Three] Seek New Trial in 70’s Police Killings, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 26, 1989, at B3. 
 4. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining to ap-
ply § 1973 to the felon disenfranchisement statutes because doing so would alter the 
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government). 
 5. See Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00-8586, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (consolidating another felon disenfranchisement case with the en banc appeal 
by Bottom, who also goes by the name Jalil Abdul Muntaqim). 
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issue in 1996.6 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, from the bluest of the blue to the reddest of the red, almost 
every single state in the Union—forty-eight out of fifty—forbids felons 
from voting to varying degrees.7  The District of Columbia also has a 
felon disenfranchisement law on its books.8  And although some 
states have restored the franchise to felons who have finished serving 
their sentences, the vast majority of states have continued to retain 
and adopt laws that prohibit felons from voting during their terms in 
prison.  For example, convicts in Massachusetts could vote, even while 
in jail, until 2000.  That November, however, the Bay State’s voters 
faced a ballot question on a proposed state constitutional amendment 
to take away the incarcerated felons’ franchise.9  The amendment 
passed by a landslide, with sixty percent voting yes and only thirty-four 
percent voting no.10  So, too, with Utah.  Incarcerated felons had the 
right to vote there until 1998, when the state’s voters similarly 
approved a constitutional amendment taking away the felons’ 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Posting of Happy Fun Lawyer to Appellate Law & Practice (noting 
the 5-5 split in Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc)), 
http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2004/12/index.html (Dec. 30, 2004, 9:15 
EST). 
 7. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Con-
sequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL 
REV.  777, 781-82 (2002) (noting that only Vermont and Maine permit incarcerated 
felons to vote).  Of the forty-eight states that bar felons from voting, thirteen of them 
continue to disenfranchise felons who have been released or are on parole, while the 
remaining states permit the reinstatement of felons’ voting rights if they have finished 
their prison terms or are on probation.  Id. 
 8. The current felon disenfranchisement laws in D.C., which is sixty percent Af-
rican-American (JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000 
(2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf), were enacted by its 
own locally elected Council after the introduction of home rule in 1974, and they 
were submitted to, and not objected to, by the Congress of the United States, the very 
body claimed here to have outlawed felon disenfranchisement.  Before granting 
home rule to the District, Congress established permanent disenfranchisement of fel-
ons there (D.C. Election Act, Pub. L. No. 83-376, § 2(2)(C), 69 Stat. 699 (1955)) but 
later permitted felons to vote upon probation, parole, pardon or the expiration of a 
fixed period after release from incarceration (Act of Dec. 23, 1971, Pub. L. 92-220, 
§ 4, 85 Stat. 788).  With home rule, Congress gave the D.C. Council plenary power 
over voter qualifications in the District (D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-207.52 (2005)) but re-
served the power to disapprove the Council’s enactments on any subject (id. at § 1-
233(c)(1)).  The D.C. Council amended the election code to disenfranchise felons 
only during incarceration.  Id. at §§ 1-1001.02(7)(A)-(B), 1-1001.07(k)(1), (3)-(4). 
 9. See MASS. CONST. amend. III, as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. CXX 
(rendering “persons who are incarcerated in a correctional facility due to a felony 
conviction” ineligible to vote); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2001) (decreeing 
the same law). 
 10. See Elections Division, Mass. Statewide Ballot Measures: 2000, http://www. 
sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/balmpdf/balm2000.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) (stat-
ing the results of the aforementioned referendum under Question Number Two). 
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franchise.11  The proposition passed virtually by acclamation, eighty-
two percent to eighteen percent.12 
Although forty-eight states have already spoken in their support for 
felon disenfranchisement, the legal and political left has championed 
felon voting rights as its latest cause célèbre.  The issue gained 
additional traction recently after several academics noted that 
Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore would have triumphed in 
Florida in 2000 and won the presidency had felons been permitted to 
vote in that state.13  And the bid by Anthony Bottom, the convicted 
double-cop-killer, to vote in prison has the support of over a dozen 
amici curiae, consisting of many prominent liberal and left-wing 
organizations such as the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 
and the Brennan Center for Justice. 
Despite the volume of Bottom’s support, the case for letting him 
and other felons vote is unconvincing and problematic both as a legal 
and policy matter.  As explained in Section I of this Article, felon 
disenfranchisement laws have long been accepted in the American 
legal system and easily pass constitutional muster.  Indeed, the 
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly permits states to adopt 
disenfranchisement statutes, and many such laws were enacted long 
before African-Americans enjoyed suffrage.  Section II explains why 
these laws are beyond the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The 
legislative history of the VRA and its 1982 amendments, as well as 
common sense, makes it perfectly clear that the statute was not 
intended to cover felon disenfranchisement laws.  As detailed in 
Section III, the VRA cannot be construed to encompass felon 
disenfranchisement laws because it would then exceed the 
enforcement powers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
Finally, Section IV discusses the policy rationales for such laws: society 
deems felons to be less trustworthy than non-felon citizens, and those 
who cannot follow the law should not participate in the passing of 
laws that govern law-abiding citizens. 
                                                          
 11. See UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (declaring that “any person convicted of a fel-
ony . . . may not be permitted to vote . . . until the right to vote . . . is restored as pro-
vided by statute”); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101.5 (1953) (permitting restora-
tion of franchise to felons on probation, discharged from incarceration, or paroled). 
 12. See http://governor.state.ut.uslt_gover/98GenPropView.htm (detailing the 
election results for statewide proposition number four). 
 13. See, e.g., Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 789-90 (explaining that because 
felons are disproportionately from portions of the population that tend to vote for 
Democratic candidates, such as the poor and African-Americans, their inability to vote 
impacts the outcome of elections). 
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I.  THE RACE-NEUTRAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
About a month before the 2004 presidential election, the 
Associated Press ran a newswire article stating that felon 
disenfranchisement laws “have roots in the post-Civil War 
[nineteenth] century and were aimed at preventing black Americans 
from voting.”14  Numerous other media outlets, including the New 
York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, also made similar 
statements about the origins of felon disenfranchisement statutes.15  
But there was one problem with such statements—they simply were 
not true. 
Contrary to the perceived wisdom of the mainstream media, felon 
disenfranchisement laws are deeply rooted in the Western tradition as 
well as American history.  As Judge Henry Friendly explained, the 
Lockean notion of a social compact undergirds laws preventing felons 
from voting: someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been 
thought to have abandoned the right to participate” in making 
them.16  Alexander Keyssar, a Harvard professor and a critic of felon 
disenfranchisement laws, has acknowledged that such laws have “a 
long history in English, European, and even Roman law.”17  Similarly, 
a report issued by the Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch 
conceded that “[d]isenfranchisement in the U.S. is a heritage from 
ancient Greek and Roman traditions carried into Europe.”18  And in 
recently upholding Florida’s statute barring felons from voting, the en 
banc Eleventh Circuit observed that “[f]elon disenfranchisement laws 
are unlike other voting qualifications” in that they are “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history.”19 
                                                          
 14. Millions locked out of US election, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 23, 2004, available 
at http://afr.com/articles/2004/09/23/1095651422800.html.  After co-author Roger 
Clegg contacted the Associated Press, it corrected the erroneous statement. 
 15. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, avail-
able at https://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp (quoting the 
New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today as attributing the creation of felon 
disenfranchisement laws to racist attempts at disenfranchisement of blacks). 
 16. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 17. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (Basic Books ed., 2000); see also NAT’L 
COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (2001), http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/ 
natl_commissions/final_report.html (noting that “the practice of denying the vote to 
individuals convicted of certain crimes is a very old one that existed under English 
law, in the colonies, and in the earliest suffrage laws of the states”). 
 18. THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE 
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), http:// 
www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/index.html. 
 19. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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In the late eighteenth century, several states began incorporating 
felon disenfranchisement statutes.  Between 1776 and 1821, eleven 
states disenfranchised persons convicted of certain “infamous” 
crimes.20  For instance, New York’s Constitution of 1821 authorized 
the Legislature to pass laws “excluding from the right of suffrage 
persons who have been, or may be, convicted of infamous crimes.”21  
By the eve of the Civil War, more than two dozen states out of thirty-
four had enacted laws preventing those convicted of committing 
serious crimes from casting a vote.22  And by the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, twenty-nine states had established felon 
disenfranchisement laws.23 
That long history refutes any suggestion that felon 
disenfranchisement provisions are racially motivated.24  Their 
antebellum origins show that they were aimed at whites and were 
maintained for race-neutral reasons: before the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the states were free to, and the vast majority 
did, impose direct and express racial qualifications on the franchise.25  
As the en banc Eleventh Circuit observed in upholding Florida’s felon 
disenfranchisement law, “at that time, the right to vote was not 
extended to African-Americans, and, therefore, they could not have 
been the targets of any [felon] disenfranchisement law.”26  Over 
seventy percent of the states in the Union in 1861 had felon 
disenfranchisement laws—at a time when most African-Americans 
were still enslaved and did not have the right to vote.  The pre-Civil 
War source of these laws “indicates that felon disenfranchisement was 
not an attempt to evade the requirements of the Civil War 
                                                          
 20. KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63. 
 21. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. II, § 2. 
 22. KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63. 
 23. Accord Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974); Green v. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 24. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 162 (arguing that late nineteenth century disen-
franchisement laws outside the South “lacked socially distinct targets and generally 
were passed in matter-of-fact fashions”); Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 795 (ex-
plaining that some southern states from 1890 to 1910 did act with racial intent in 
passing laws that disenfranchised persons who were convicted of crimes, but by that 
time, over eighty percent of the states in the U.S. already had felon disenfranchise-
ment laws); Alexander Keyssar, Did States Restrict the Voting Rights of Felons on Ac-
count of Racism?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2004, http://hnn.us/articles/ 
7635.html  (noting that even in some states in the post-Civil War South, “felon disen-
franchisement provisions were first enacted [by] . . . Republican governments that 
supported black voting rights”). 
 25. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 55-56 & Figure 3.1 (explaining that by 1855, 
twenty-five of the thirty States had express “race exclusions” that prevented blacks 
from voting, and the five that did not “contained only [four] percent of the free black 
population”). 
 26. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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Amendments or to perpetuate racial discrimination forbidden by 
those amendments.”27 
The framers of the Civil War Amendments saw nothing racially 
discriminatory about felon disenfranchisement.  To the contrary, they 
expressly recognized the power of the states to prohibit felons from 
voting.  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a 
state’s denial of voting rights “for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime” could not serve as a basis for reducing their representation in 
Congress.28  As the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez, 
Section 2 is thus “an affirmative sanction” by the Constitution of “the 
exclusion of felons from the vote”—even felons who, like the plaintiffs 
in Ramirez, had finished their sentences.29  This conclusion 
rests on the demonstrably sound proposition that §1 [the Equal 
Protection Clause], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could 
not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement 
which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of 
reduced representation which §2 imposed for other forms of 
disenfranchisement.30 
Thus, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment “expressly permits 
states to disenfranchise convicted felons.”31 
Nor did the Reconstruction Congresses see any conflict between 
felon disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment.  As the 
Supreme Court observed at length in Ramirez, Congress, in 
readmitting states to the Union, consistently approved state 
constitutions that excluded felons from the franchise.32  In fact, the 
Fortieth Congress—the very same Congress that proposed the 
Fifteenth Amendment—approved such constitutions, and the next 
Congress did so both before and after the Fifteenth Amendment was 
ratified.33 
In light of their historical origin, felon disenfranchisement laws 
                                                          
 27. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 29. 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 55. 
 31. Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis added). 
 32. Accord id. at 1218 (discussing the long history of Florida’s criminal disenfran-
chisement); see Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 48-52 (noting the approving congressional atti-
tude toward state constitutional disenfranchisement provisions at the time of the Re-
construction). 
 33. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 51-52 (citing readmission statutes enacted in June 
1868 and January, February, March, and May 1870).  The Fifteenth Amendment was 
passed on February 26, 1869 by the Fortieth Congress (which began on March 4, 
1867 and ended on March 3, 1869), and was ratified on February 3, 1870 during the 
Forty-First Congress.  See Lexisnexis.com, Timeline for Ratifications of Constitutional 
Amendments, http://www.lexisnexis.com/constitution/amendments_timeline.asp 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2005). 
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easily pass constitutional muster.  As any student of constitutional law 
knows, the Constitution bars only laws that are facially discriminatory 
or are motivated by intentional discrimination.34  But it appears that 
all of the felon disenfranchisement statutes on the books today were 
enacted or amended with a race-neutral purpose.35  Not surprisingly, 
the Supreme Court has consistently held not only that “the states had 
both a right to disenfranchise [felons and] ex-felons,” but also that 
they had “a compelling interest in doing so.”36  As early as 1890, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that a territorial legislature’s 
statute that “exclude[d] from the privilege of voting . . . those who 
have been convicted of certain offenses” was “not open to any 
constitutional or legal objection.”37  A unanimous Warren Court 
decision recognized that a “criminal record” is one of the “factors 
which a State may take into consideration in determining the 
qualifications of voters.”38  Today’s Court agrees: the holding “that a 
convicted felon may be denied the right to vote” remains 
“unexceptionable.”39  And federal circuit courts recently have 
rejected constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws 
based on racially disparate impact arguments.40 
                                                          
 34. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment bars only intentional discrimination by the state).  This same 
standard almost certainly applies to its sister Reconstruction Amendment, the Fif-
teenth Amendment.  Id.; see also, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-65 
(1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment “prohibits only 
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to 
vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”). 
 35. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63 (explaining that a felon disenfranchisement 
law that is facially non-discriminatory can still be unconstitutional if it was motivated 
by racial discrimination); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1985) 
(striking down a Jim Crow-era, misdemeanant disenfranchisement statute in Alabama 
that had been enacted with the intent to discriminate against blacks). 
 36. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 162 (discussing the rationale and widespread 
support for the disenfranchisement laws). 
 37. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1890) (holding that territorial leg-
islatures had a right to impose “reasonable qualifications” on voters so long as they 
were “not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the United States”). 
 38. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) 
(comparing the use of constitutionally allowable factors, such as a criminal record, 
with the constitutionality of using literacy as a voting requirement). 
 39. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that while some voting 
requirements are no longer constitutional, a convicted felon still may be denied the 
right to vote);  see also, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 
1967) (noting that the Supreme Court “frequently recognized” “propriety of exclud-
ing felons from the franchise,” and citing cases in support). 
 40. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the disenfranchisement provisions were not intended to discriminate 
against minority voters and that there was no evidence that the Voting Rights Act was 
intended to reach the disenfranchisement provisions); see also, e.g., Muntaqim v. 
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding that the Voting Rights Act did 
not apply to the New York disenfranchisement statutes). 
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II.  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S NON-APPLICATION TO FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
A.  The Legislative History of the Voting Rights Act and Its 
Amendments 
Federal circuit courts are split as to whether the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (as amended by the 1982 amendment) can invalidate felon 
disenfranchisement statutes on the grounds that such laws have a 
racially disproportionate impact on minorities.  While the Ninth 
Circuit has expressly held that the VRA can cover felon 
disenfranchisement laws,41 the en banc Eleventh Circuit has ruled 
that it does not reach such laws.42  The more sensible and reasonable 
interpretation of the VRA is that Congress did not intend it to apply 
to felon disenfranchisement statutes. 
Congress passed the VRA to address various exclusionary practices 
that had been historically employed in the South to prevent blacks 
from voting.  There is no reasonable indication in either the language 
or the legislative history of the original VRA that it was intended to 
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes.  The only provision of the 
Act that Congress thought could even remotely implicate felon 
disenfranchisement was Section 4, which prohibits any requirement of 
“good moral character” to vote.  But the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
report—joined by Senators Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, 
Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, Fong, Scott and Javits—took pains 
to note that even that provision “would not result in the proscription 
of the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that 
an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction 
of a felony.”43  On the floor, Senator Tydings repeated the point: the 
law would not bar states from imposing “a requirement that an 
applicant for voting or registration be free of conviction of a felony . . 
. .  These grounds for disqualification are objective, easily applied, and 
                                                          
 41. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that felons can challenge disenfranchisement statutes under the Voting Rights Act); 
see also Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming that the 
Voting Rights Act applies to disenfranchisement laws but finding no violation); cf. 
Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 1333  (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (dismissing 
suit for failure to state claim but assuming without discussion that the Voting Rights 
Act could be applied to felon disenfranchisement statute). 
 42. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234  (holding that the Voting Rights Act does not 
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes).  The Second Circuit reached the same re-
sult, but as noted previously, the court has agreed to rehear the issue en banc.  See 
Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130. 
 43. See S. REP. NO. 89-162, Pt. 3, 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2508, 2562 (identifying felon disenfranchisement laws as an exception to the rule 
which prohibits use of tests or devices that are used to abridge the right to vote on the 
basis of race or color). 
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do not lend themselves to fraudulent manipulation.”44  The House 
Judiciary Committee report agreed: “[The VRA] does not proscribe a 
requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State that an 
applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of 
a felony . . . .”45 
These are the only references to felon disenfranchisement made in 
reports to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.46  Thus, its legislative history 
shows that: “Congress did not intend . . . the Voting Rights Act to 
cover felon disenfranchisement provisions[;]” “tests for literacy or 
good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon 
disenfranchisement provisions should not[;]” “legislators intended to 
exempt the voting restrictions of felons from the statute’s coverage[;]” 
“the Voting Rights Act was not designed to reach felon 
disenfranchisement provisions[;]” and “neither house of Congress 
intended to include felon disenfranchisement within the statute’s 
scope.”47 
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to bar procedures 
that “result” in the denial or abridgment of voting rights “on account 
of race or color.”48  The purpose of this amendment was to overrule 
certain Supreme Court decisions that Congress believed were contrary 
to the original intent of the statute.  The amended statutory text, 
however, is notably ambiguous, and so “[u]nfortunately, it ‘is 
exceedingly difficult to discern what [Section 2] means.’”49  While the 
                                                          
 44. See 111 CONG. REC. S8366 (1965) (statement of Sen. Tydings) (clarifying that 
the felon disenfranchisement laws are allowed, because they are objective means of 
determining qualifications for voting and are not subjective such as the good moral 
character requirement). 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, 25-26 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 
2457. 
 46. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233 (reviewing congressional statements in the 
House and Senate reports for the Voting Rights Act’s application to states’ disenfran-
chisement provisions).  
 47. Id. at 1231-34 (emphasis in original). 
 48. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act changed the statute such that 
it now reads: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in 
a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982) (emphasis added).  It has previously read: “No voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right 
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 
 49. Accord Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 (discussing the ambiguity in Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act in its application to the felon disenfranchisement provisions); 
see Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing the scope of 
the Voting Rights Act to determine if it encompasses states’ disenfranchisement pro-
visions and thereby creates a constitutional question) (quoting Goosby v. Town Bd., 
180 F.3d 476, 499 (2d Cir. 1999)) (Leval, J., concurring). 
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introduction of the word “result” arguably indicates that it might 
cover state actions not motivated by racial animus, the statute also 
incorporates the critical language in the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of intentional racial discrimination—“den[ial] or 
abridg[ment]” of the right to vote “on account of race [or] color.”50  
As discussed more fully in Section II.B., the use of the words “‘on 
account of’” means that “‘[t]he existence of some form of racial 
discrimination . . . remains the cornerstone of [Section 2] claims,’” 
and shows that “Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on 
purposeful discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 
1982.”51 
The tension between “results in” and “on account of” renders the 
provision ambiguous.  Indeed, it is precisely because of this ambiguity 
that the Supreme Court relied upon the 1982 legislative history to 
come up with the so-called Gingles factors52 in order to give content 
to Section 2.  Ironically, the litigants who have launched VRA 
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws seek to rely on this 
legislative history, which does not specifically deal with felon 
disenfranchisement, while ignoring the extensive legislative history 
that specifically dealt with the subject. 
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments reflects not the 
slightest suggestion that Congress changed the original intent to 
preserve felon disenfranchisement.  Indeed, even though it “details 
many discriminatory techniques used by certain jurisdictions,” 
“[t]here is simply no discussion of felon disenfranchisement in the 
legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendments.”53  Given that 
forty-six states in 1982 had felon disenfranchisement laws, it seems 
inconceivable that Congress would sub silentio amend the Voting 
Rights Act to invalidate the laws of forty-six states, many of which have 
had such statutes since the founding of the Republic.54 
                                                          
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added). 
 51. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117 (reasoning that the Congress did not abandon 
its focus on purposeful racial discrimination with the amendment in 1982) (quoting 
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994)).  
 52. See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986) (establishing the fol-
lowing factors in determining validity of challenges under Section 2: the extent to 
which minority group members have been elected to public office and the extent to 
which voting in the state or political subdivision is racially polarized).  The Court also 
recognized that other supportive factors may exist, but that these are not essential to a 
minority voter’s claim of dilution.  Id. 
 53. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233-35 (emphasis added) (analyzing congressional 
records to find legislative intent for the Voting Rights Act’s application to felon disen-
franchisement provisions). 
 54. See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123-24 (noting prevalence of felon disen-
franchisement as a form of punishment in most states throughout U.S. history), 
quoted in Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (“considering the prevalence of felon disenfran-
chisement in every region of the country since the Founding, it seems unfathomable 
11
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Overturning felon disenfranchisement remains unfathomable to 
Congress to this very day.  The VRA’s utterly “one-sided legislative 
history is buttressed by subsequent Congressional acts.  Since 1982, 
Congress has made it easier for states to disenfranchise felons.”55  The 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only provides that a 
felony conviction may be the basis for canceling a voter’s registration, 
but requires federal prosecutors to notify state election officials of 
federal felony convictions.56  The Help America Vote Act of 2002 
actually instructs state election officials to purge disenfranchised 
felons “on a regular basis” from their computerized voting lists.57  The 
enactment of these provisions plainly “suggests that Congress did not 
intend to sweep felon disenfranchisement laws within the scope of the 
VRA.”58 
Not only that, in considering what ultimately became the Help 
America Vote Act, the Senate actually voted on a floor amendment 
that would have required states to allow felons to vote after they had 
completed their terms of incarceration, parole, or probation.59  The 
proposal would only have applied to federal elections—and its 
sponsors emphasized they had no quarrel with denying the franchise 
to convicts who were still serving their sentences.  In the words of the 
principal sponsor, Senator Reid, who was then the majority whip, 
We have a saying in this country: “If you do the crime, you have to 
do the time.”  I agree with that . . . .  [T]he amendment . . . is 
narrow in scope.  It does not extend voting rights to prisoners.  I 
don’t believe in that.  It does not extend voting rights to ex-felons 
on parole, even though eighteen States do that.60 
Despite being “narrow in scope,” the amendment was rejected by a 
large bipartisan majority: thirty-one yeas, sixty-three nays.61 
                                                          
that Congress would silently amend the Voting Rights Act in a way that would affect 
them”). 
 55. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (emphasis in original). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6 (2002) (requiring the U.S. attorney to give written no-
tice of any felony convictions in federal courts to the chief state election official). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2002) (instructing the election officials to 
coordinate state computerized voter  registration list with state agency records on fel-
ony status for the purpose of removing names of ineligible voters). 
 58. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 n.39 (discussing the various laws that Congress has 
enacted making it easier for states to disenfranchise felons); accord Farrakhan v. 
Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
 59. See 148 CONG. REC. S797-98 (Feb. 14, 2002) (proposed amendment 2879 to S. 
565). 
 60. See 148 CONG. REC. S801-02 (statement of Sen. Reid) (speaking in favor of 
the amendment which, aside from its narrow scope, could serve as an example to 
states); see also 148 CONG. REC. S804-05 (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Specter). 
 61. See id. at S809 (noting that twenty-three Democrats and forty Republicans 
voted “nay”). 
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Since then, bills have been repeatedly introduced in Congress that 
essentially copy Senator Reid’s proposal verbatim—but not one has so 
much as been voted out of committee.62  This legislative record belies 
the contention that Congress has ever sought to do away with felon 
disenfranchisement in any form.  At the very least, submission of the 
Reid amendment and the follow-on bills would have made absolutely 
no sense “if Congress has the clear understanding that the Voting 
Rights Act currently covers those cases.”63  The fact is, Congress has 
never had any such understanding, ever. 
B.  The “Results” Test and the Claim of Disparate Impact 
As set forth above, there is absolutely no indication in the legislative 
history of the 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act that the 
introduction of the word “results” was intended to create a simple 
disparate impact test.  And the very language of the VRA as well as 
common sense undercuts any such claim of disparate impact: the 
continued requirement in the statute that the denial or abridgement 
of the right to vote be “on account of race or color” mimics the key 
phrase used in the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of intentional 
racial discrimination.64  Indeed, the plain meaning of “on account of” 
is “for the sake of” or “by the reason of”65—underscoring that 
“Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on purposeful 
discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.”66 
The inclusion of the phrase “on account of race or color” appears 
to modify the word “results,” thereby requiring some causational link 
between intentional racial discrimination and “results.”  Simply put, 
felon disenfranchisement laws may have a disproportional impact on 
certain racial minorities, but they do not violate the VRA because the 
impact is not on “account of,” “for the sake of,” or “by the reason of” 
                                                          
 62. See Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 701(d) (2005) (using 
identical language as that in Senator Reid’s proposal to establish voting rights for ex-
felons who have served their sentences); see also Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 
2005, H.R. 663, 109th Cong. (2005) (aiming to secure federal voting rights for quali-
fied ex-offenders who have served their sentences); Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 
2003, H.R. 1433, 108th Cong. (2003); Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 
2003, H.R. 259, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). 
 63. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1318 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(Kravitch, J., dissenting), panel opinion vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 
1163 (11th Cir. 2004), judgment of district court aff’d, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc majority opinion by Kravitch, J.) (upholding Florida’s permanent disen-
franchisement statute). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added). 
 65. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2005) (defining “on account of”). 
 66. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 117 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing the 
language of the 1982 amended Voting Rights Act to determine the legislative intent). 
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race or color.  As the Sixth Circuit said in rejecting a disparate impact-
type VRA claim, felons are not “disenfranchised because of an 
immutable characteristic, such as race, but rather because of their 
conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the 
risks of detention and punishment.”67  Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit 
explained that Section 2 of the VRA 
explicitly retains racial bias as the gravamen of a . . . claim.  The 
existence of some form of racial discrimination therefore remains 
the cornerstone of section 2 claims; to be actionable, a deprivation 
of the minority group’s right to equal participation in the political 
process must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice 
that depends on race or color.  The scope of the Voting Rights Act 
is indeed quite broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2 
suggests, extend only to defeats experienced by voters ‘on account 
of race or color,’ not on account of some other racially neutral 
cause.68 
Accordingly, because “the causation of the denial of the right to 
vote to felons . . . consists entirely of their conviction, not their 
race,”69 it “does not ‘result’ from the state’s qualification of the right 
to vote on account of race or color and thus . . . does not violate the 
Voting Rights Act.”70  The “mere fact that many incarcerated felons 
happen to be black and [L]atino is insufficient grounds to implicate 
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act,” even under 
Section 2.71 
                                                          
 67. Accord Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding 
that disenfranchisement provisions do not deny people a right to vote due to an im-
mutable characteristic, but because of their criminal acts), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 353 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a fact-finder could conclude 
under the totality of circumstances test that the plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates in-
tentional racial discrimination behind Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions), 
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 405 F.3d 
1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition 
against voting qualifications that result in abridgment of the right to vote on account 
of race does not apply to Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Wesley v. 
Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the disproportionate 
impact on Tennessee’s black population did not result from Tennessee’s qualification 
of the right to vote on account of race or color); see also Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 
979, 981 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show any connection be-
tween historical discrimination against blacks and the felon disenfranchisement pro-
visions). 
 68. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th 
Cir.1993) (en banc)). 
 69. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (holding that the facts presented in this case show 
no other causation than the criminal activity of the ex-felons for the denial to their 
right to vote). 
 70. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis added). 
 71. See Jones, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
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So, if statistics showing racial disparities alone are insufficient to 
establish a Section 2 violation even when the disparities directly relate 
to the electoral process, then statistics that are at least one step 
removed from that must also, by definition, be insufficient.  Yet the 
case against felon disenfranchisement laws is based upon the 
assumption that “‘race-based disparities in sentencing’”—“that, as a 
result of racial discrimination in sentencing, black and Hispanic 
felons are more likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . . 
and are therefore more likely to be disenfranchised.”72  But the case 
law establishes clearly that “[e]vidence of statistical disparities in an 
area external to voting, which then result in statistical disparities in 
voting,” do not prove a Section 2 violation.73  For example, in Wesley 
v. Collins, the court upheld Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement 
provision against a Section 2 claim that was based, as here, on 
statistical disparities in conviction rates;74 the Third Circuit in Ortiz v. 
City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter 
Registration Division rejected a Section 2 claim that a statute purging 
voter registrations of those who did not vote for two years had a 
disparate statistical impact on minorities;75 the court in Salas v. 
Southwest Texas Junior College District rejected a Section 2 claim 
that an at-large voting system harmed minorities because of statistical 
disparities in voter turnout;76 and in Irby v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections, the Fourth Circuit rejected a Section 2 claim premised on 
disparities in the rates at which blacks and whites sought appointive 
positions.77 
Indeed, to ignore these cases here would lead to an absurdity: 
felons would be allowed to prove a denial of voting rights as a result of 
racial discrimination in sentencing on the basis of evidence legally 
insufficient to establish an actual claim of racial discrimination in 
sentencing.  In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court held that 
statistical disparities cannot be the basis for a Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                          
 72. See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
by the Court) (quoting felon-appellant’s brief). 
 73. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that statistical disparities are not enough to establish vote de-
nial under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
 74. 791 F.2d at 1262. 
 75. See 28 F.3d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that no evidence was pre-
sented to show that the neutral vote purging law discriminates against a particular 
class). 
 76. See 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff failed to 
link low voter turnout by the Hispanic population to past official discrimination). 
 77. See 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (deciding that the disparities be-
tween whites and blacks in representative positions does not in itself show that dis-
crimination played a role in the selection or election process). 
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claim to overturn a criminal conviction or sentence; a defendant must 
show that he himself or she herself suffered discrimination on the 
basis of race, and must show that on the basis of things that happened 
in his or her case.78  “Because discretion is essential to the criminal 
justice process,” statistical evidence “is clearly insufficient to support 
any inference that any of the decision-makers in [a particular] case 
acted with discriminatory purpose.”79  This is so even in a capital case, 
as McCleskey was. 
If the Voting Rights Act were construed to ban felon 
disenfranchisement, then convicted felons could invoke the very same 
racial statistics that they cannot invoke to assert the right to walk the 
streets.  That result alone would be odd, to say the least.  And this 
“logic” moves swiftly from the incongruous to the unimaginable: the 
VRA would probably abolish capital punishment nationwide because 
if similar statistical disparities appear in capital sentences, then the 
execution of such sentences, which plainly effect a permanent denial 
of the right to vote, would necessarily “result[] in a denial or 
abridgment of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”80 
C.  Any Prima Facie Showing of Adverse “Results” Is Easily Rebutted 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1982 amendments 
to the Voting Rights Act established some form of a pure disparate 
impact standard, states could easily rebut any prima facie case of 
disproportional impact because of their strong and legitimate 
interests in maintaining their own electoral laws.81  As discussed in 
Section IV, states have substantial reasons to limit the right to vote to 
persons deemed trustworthy, and thereby exclude children, aliens, 
the mentally incompetent, and those who have been convicted of 
serious crimes. 
The Supreme Court has held that “the State’s interest in 
maintaining an electoral system . . . is a legitimate factor to be 
considered by courts among the ‘totality of circumstances’ in 
determining whether a [Section] 2 violation [of the 1965 Act] has 
occurred.”82  Thus, for example, the en banc Fifth Circuit rejected a 
                                                          
 78. See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (ruling that the evidence failed to show that any 
decision maker in defendant’s case acted with a discriminatory purpose, and that the 
statistical racially-correlated discrepancy did not show a significant risk of racial bias in 
Georgia’s capital sentencing process). 
 79. Id. at 297. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982). 
 81. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 173 
(2001) (discussing the lack of constitutional or VRA violations in felon disenfran-
chisement provisions). 
 82. Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991). 
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challenge to Texas’s county-wide election system for its district court 
judges—notwithstanding alleged disproportionate impact on minority 
candidates—on the grounds that the state had a “substantial interest” 
in linking jurisdiction and electoral base, and thereby promoting “the 
fact and appearance of judicial fairness.”83 
There is little doubt that the states have an equally substantial 
interest in preventing felons, especially those still incarcerated, from 
voting and potentially affecting elections.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the state’s “legitimate and compelling interest” in 
disenfranchising felons outweighed any supposed racial impact.84  
Indeed, the Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments found state 
authority to disenfranchise felons to be of such importance that they 
expressly permitted it in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”85  
As the Supreme Court put it, “[n]o function is more essential to the 
separate and independent existence of the States and their 
governments than the power to determine within the limits of the 
Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county 
and municipal offices . . . .”86 
D.  The Clear Statement Rule: A Caution Against Preemption of 
States’ Powers 
An expansive and unreasonable reading of the Voting Rights Act to 
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes not only is contrary to the 
intent of Congress, but it also upsets the delicate balance between 
federal and state powers.  The “clear statement” rule—which applies 
when the statutory text is ambiguous as in the case of the VRA—
cautions courts to tread lightly in interpreting vague statutes to avoid 
impinging upon the traditional spheres of the states: “[I]f Congress 
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States 
and the Federal Government, it must make its intention unmistakably 
clear in the language of the statute . . . .  [Congress must] make its 
intention clear and manifest if it intends to pre-empt the historic 
powers of the States.”87 
                                                          
 83. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 868-69 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
 84. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
when the felon disenfranchisement law is viewed in context of “totality of circum-
stances,” it is apparent that the law does not violate the VRA). 
 85. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyz-
ing the constitutional implications of applying the Voting Rights Act to state felon 
disenfranchisement provisions).  
 86. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (emphasis added) (discuss-
ing the constitutional objective of preserving states’ rights and governing autonomy). 
 87. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (emphasis added; citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
17
Clegg et al.: The Bullet and the Ballot? The Case for Felon Disenfranchisement
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
18 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:1 
This rule of construction controls whenever a federal statute 
touches on “traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting 
the federal balance.”88  And when it applies, the rule requires that, 
absent a clear statement, courts must “interpret a statute to preserve 
rather than destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers.’”89 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court faced the question of 
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited 
Missouri from enforcing a mandatory retirement age for state 
judges.90  The Court held that it did not.  It applied the clear 
statement rule because the case implicated “the authority of the 
people of the States to determine the qualifications of their 
government officials.”91  The fact that Congress’s intent on the issue 
was “at least ambiguous” was enough to resolve the question: under 
the clear statement rule, it could not “give the state-displacing weight 
of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”92 
Felon disenfranchisement involves authority that is at least as 
important as the State’s power to determine “the qualifications of 
their government officials,” as it involves the power to determine who 
gets to choose those officials and their qualifications.  If defining the 
qualifications of important government officials lies at the heart of 
representative government, then surely defining who decides what 
those qualifications will be is equally, if not more, important.  That by 
itself suffices to require a clear statement, but even more is involved 
here: the fundamental state power to “defin[e] and enforc[e] the 
criminal law,” for which, of course, “the States possess primary 
authority.”93 
The confluence of these two fundamental lines of state authority, 
indeed, expressly appears in the Constitution’s text.  Thus, not only 
does the Constitution defer to the States to set voter qualifications 
even for federal elections,94 but, as noted above, the Constitution 
affirmatively sanctions the States’ historic authority to disenfranchise 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 461 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (quoting Gregory, 501 
U.S. at 460-61). 
 90. See generally Gregory, 501 U.S. 452. 
 91. See id. at 463. 
 92. Id. at 464, 467 (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 93. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); see also Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting 
the longstanding tradition of deference to a state legislature’s role in criminal justice 
matters). 
 94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl.1 (requiring that those who elect United 
States Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislatures”). 
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people “for participation in rebellion, or other crime.”95  The States 
have the primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide whether felons 
should vote.  That is what the Constitution provides. 
Accordingly, if it is to disturb the federal-state balance in the area of 
voter qualifications, Congress must be clear—unmistakably clear—
about it.  And Congress certainly knows how to be quite clear when it 
comes to voting rights: it was clear about literacy tests,96 clear about 
educational-attainment requirements,97 clear about knowledge tests,98 
clear about moral character tests,99 clear about vouching 
requirements,100 clear about English-language requirements,101 clear 
about English-only elections,102 and clear about poll taxes103 to give 
just a few examples. 
But the text of the VRA makes no unmistakably clear statement—it 
makes no statement at all—about felon disenfranchisement.  And so it 
cannot be construed “to pre-empt the historic powers of the States”104 
and “to destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers’”105 by 
prohibiting felon disenfranchisement. 
III.  THE ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS 
There is yet another reason why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
cannot be read to bar felon disenfranchisement laws: such an 
interpretation would exceed Congress’s enforcement powers under 
                                                          
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (2005) (prohibiting states from conducting 
literacy tests as a qualification for voting unless it is administered to all voters, is 
wholly in writing, and answers are provided to voters within twenty-five days upon re-
quest); id. at § 1971(a)(3)(B) (defining “literacy test” as “any test of the ability to 
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c)(1) 
(2005) (explaining that the phrase “test or device” shall mean “any requirement that 
a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the 
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”). 
 97. Id. at § 1973b(c)(2) (explaining that literacy tests include tests to “demon-
strate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at  § 1973b(c)(3). 
 100. Id. at  § 1973b(c)(4). 
 101. See id. at § 1973b(e)(1) (prohibiting the States from conditioning the right 
to vote upon the ability to understand the English language). 
 102. See id. at § 1973(b)(f)(1) (forbidding the States from holding English-only 
elections because of widespread discrimination of citizens who do not speak English). 
 103. Id. at § 1973(h)(a) (finding that poll taxes have no relation to the electoral 
process, prevent poor citizens from voting and have been used as a means to deter 
minorities from voting). 
 104. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461(1991). 
 105.  Pa. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (quoting Greg-
ory, 501 U.S. at 460-61). 
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the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
These two Reconstruction Amendments contain parallel grants of 
power to Congress to “enforce” the amendments’ substantive 
provisions “by appropriate legislation.”106  But as the Supreme Court 
has emphasized in recent years, Congress cannot rewrite the 
constitutional provisions, as “Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what that right is.”107  It has no 
power to engage in a “substantive redefinition of the . . . right at 
issue,”108 and can only “enact prophylactic legislation”—legislation 
that “proscribes facially constitutional conduct”—to the extent 
necessary “in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional 
conduct.”109 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has insisted that “[t]here must be 
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”110  To meet that 
test, Congress must do two things: (1) “identify conduct transgressing 
. . . substantive provisions” of the amendments and (2) “tailor its 
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”111 
The first requirement demands that Congress develop a “legislative 
record” that demonstrates a “history and pattern” of unconstitutional 
state conduct.112  In other words, “[f]or Congress to enact proper 
enforcement legislation, there must be a record of constitutional 
violations.”113  To meet the second requirement, the purportedly 
prophylactic legislation must not be “so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood 
as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional 
behavior.”114  Congress thus must narrowly “tailor its legislative 
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”115 
There can be no dispute: Section 2 would fail both tests if it were 
construed to prohibit felon disenfranchisement.  To begin with, 
“when Congress enacted the VRA and its subsequent amendments, 
there was a complete absence of congressional findings that felon 
                                                          
 106.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. at amend. XV, § 2. 
 107. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 108. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
 109. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (emphasis 
added). 
 110. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 111. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 
(1999). 
 112. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). 
 113. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 114. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 115. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. at 628. 
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss1/1
2006] THE BULLET AND THE BALLOT? 21 
disenfranchisement laws were used to discriminate against minority 
voters.”116  That is enough to doom any construction of Section 2 that 
reaches felon disenfranchisement.  In Oregon v. Mitchell, for 
example, the Supreme Court struck down the 1970 amendments to 
the VRA that, among other things, tried to lower from twenty-one to 
eighteen the minimum voting age throughout the Nation.117  The 
Court struck down the voting-age provision to the extent it applied to 
state elections.  In announcing the Court’s judgment, Justice Black 
noted that “Congress made no legislative findings that the twenty-one-
year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise 
voters on account of race.”118  Congress has not made any such 
legislative findings about felon disenfranchisement, either.119 
Not only has Congress not found that felon disenfranchisement has 
produced “any significant pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination,”120 and not only does “the legislative record . . . simply 
fail[] to show that Congress did in fact identify such a pattern,”121 the 
record actually shows that Congress found the opposite.  Congress saw 
nothing wrong with the “frequent requirement of States and political 
subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be 
free of conviction of a felony,”122 because it found that this 
requirement was “objective, easily applied, and do[es] not lend [itself] 
to fraudulent manipulation.”123  It found that “tests for literacy or 
good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon 
disenfranchisement provisions should not.”124  In short, “not only has 
Congress failed ever to make a legislative finding that felon 
disenfranchisement is a pretext . . . for racial discrimination[,] it has 
                                                          
 116. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 (emphasis added). 
 117. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 118. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
 119. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) 
(striking down application of the Americans with Disabilities Act against State em-
ployers because “[t]he legislative record . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in 
fact identify a pattern” of unconstitutional discrimination by States against the dis-
abled); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (striking down civil rem-
edy for gender-motivated violence because “Congress’s findings indicate that the 
problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not 
exist in all States, or even most States”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 
(2000) (striking down application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
against State employers because of “Congress’s failure to uncover any significant pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination here”). 
 120. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. 
 121. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369. 
 122. S. REP. NO. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562. 
 123. 111 CONG. REC. S8366 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). 
 124. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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effectively determined that it is not.”125 
To apply Section 2 to strike down all felon disenfranchisement laws, 
including those enacted and enforced without a discriminatory 
purpose, would be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”126  Instead, it would 
“attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections”127—
something the Constitution simply does not allow.128 
IV.  THE POLICY REASONS FOR FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
During a 2000 presidential debate in Iowa, the frontrunner 
candidate explicitly endorsed the ban on felon voting: “The principle 
that convicted felons do not have a right to vote is an old one, it is 
well-established,” he said, adding that “felonies—certainly heinous 
crimes—should result in a disenfranchisement.”129 
That candidate was Vice President Al Gore, and, as set forth below, 
he had good policy reasons for supporting the ban on felon voting.  
But this issue has become heavily politicized in recent years, in large 
                                                          
 125. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). 
 127. Id. at 509. 
 128. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), 
does not change the analysis here.  Even apart from the fact it came after the 1982 
Voting Rights Act amendments, Hunter actually demonstrates that the congruence 
and proportionality test could never be met in the context of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws.  Hunter was not a felon disenfranchisement case.  It was a misdemeanant 
disenfranchisement case.  It struck down a Jim Crow-era provision, unquestionably 
enacted and applied by Alabama with racial animus and discriminatory intent, that 
denied the franchise to those who committed “any . . . crime involving moral turpi-
tude,” a phrase that referred to “many misdemeanors,” including “[v]arious minor 
nonfelony offenses such as presenting a worthless check and petty larceny,” offenses 
specifically “selected for inclusion” by Alabama’s 1901 constitutional convention be-
cause they “were believed by the delegates to be more frequently committed by 
blacks.”  Id. at 226-27.  It was that sort of provision, not a traditional felon disenfran-
chisement provision, that was challenged and invalidated in Hunter as being an “en-
actment . . . motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks.”  Id. at 233. 
  Even the findings of racial animus in Hunter could not possibly support the 
construction of Section 2 to include felon disenfranchisement laws: it would go far 
beyond a remedy for the specific form of intentional discrimination found in one 
Southern state in Hunter.  “Given that racial minorities are overrepresented in the 
felon population” throughout the Nation, “the plaintiffs’ theory would cast into 
doubt most felon disenfranchisement laws in this country.”  Johnson, 405 F.3d at 
1231.  But that case, involving a completely different kind of provision in a single 
State, simply cannot be “sufficient to support the regulation of felon disenfranchise-
ment scheme[s] in all fifty states.”  Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 126 (2d Cir. 
2002) (emphasis added in part).  For under the congruence and proportionality test, 
Congress may not create “remedies . . . appl[ying] uniformly throughout the Nation” 
when unconstitutional conduct “does not exist in all States, or even most States.”  
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000). 
 129. Transcript of Jan. 17, 2005 Democratic Primary Debate, available at http:// 
www.gwu.edu/~action/primdeb/primdeb0117tr.html. 
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part due to the contested results in Florida in 2000.  However, if it is 
soberly analyzed outside the prism of partisan politics, there are 
reasonable justifications for felon disenfranchisement, particularly for 
those who have committed serious crimes or are still incarcerated. 
First, felon disenfranchisement laws are justified on the basis of the 
Lockean notion of a social contract: as Judge Henry Friendly once put 
it, someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been thought to 
have abandoned the right to participate” in making them.130  
Furthermore, 
it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that 
that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the 
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the 
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges 
who are to consider their cases.131 
That same reasoning motivated Massachusetts then-governor Paul 
Celluci in 2000 to support a ballot initiative stripping incarcerated 
felons of the right to vote after prisoners began to organize a political 
action committee.132  A Massachusetts state legislative leader 
commented about the State’s now-abolished practice of allowing 
incarcerated felons to vote: “It makes no sense.  We incarcerate 
people and we take away their right to run their own lives and leave 
them with the ability to influence how we run our lives?”133 
Second, disenfranchisement has traditionally been deemed a part 
of a punishment for committing a crime.134  Criminal punishment 
can be meted out in various ways, including imprisonment, fines, 
probation, and, yes, the withdrawal of certain rights and privileges.  In 
the American system, it has long been established that “the States 
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal 
law.”135 
Third, society considers convicts, even those who have completed 
their prison terms, to be less trustworthy than non-convicted 
citizens.136  In other areas of the law, full rights and privileges are not 
                                                          
 130.  Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Clegg, supra note 81, at 172-73. 
 133. Id. at 172 (emphasis added; quoting Editorial, Jailhouse Vote, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 7, 1999, at A26 (quoting Massachusetts State Rep. Francis Marini)). 
 134. See, e.g., Todd F. Gaziano, Election Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar. 
14, 2001,  available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/Test 
031401.cfm (noting that felon disenfranchisement is permitted under Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 135. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 136. Clegg, supra note 81, at 174. 
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always restored to convicts, even though they may have “paid their 
debt to society.”137  For example, federal law prohibits the possession 
of a firearm for anyone indicted for or convicted of a felony 
punishable by at least one year in prison.138  Also under federal law, 
anyone who has a “charge pending” or has been convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for one year or more cannot serve on a 
jury.139  So if someone who has a “charge pending” against him is 
deemed incapable of sitting in judgment of the fate of a single 
litigant, it hardly seems unreasonable to say that someone convicted 
of a felony cannot help shape the fate of a city, a state, or the entire 
nation.  Even outside the realm of civic rights and privileges, society 
recognizes that an ex-convict may be less reliable than others.  For 
example, employers routinely ask prospective employees whether they 
have been arrested (let alone convicted of a felony) because they 
suspect that the mere fact of an arrest may be an indication of 
untrustworthiness. 
Critics of felon disenfranchisement laws note that these laws have a 
disproportionate impact on certain racial minority groups.140  While 
society can be sensitive to such concerns, it is not a sufficient reason to 
abolish longstanding and justifiable laws in the attempt to achieve 
some form of racial balance.  As W.E.B. DuBois once wrote, “Draw 
lines of crime, of incompetency, of vice, as tightly and 
uncompromisingly as you will, for these things must be proscribed; 
but a color-line not only does not accomplish this purpose, but 
thwarts it.”141  In fact, the abolition of felon disenfranchisement laws 
may have the unintended effect of creating “anti-law enforcement” 
voting blocs and victimizing the vast majority of law-abiding minority 
citizens who live in high-crime urban areas.142  Ultimately the real 
solution is to deter and prevent the crimes from being committed, not 
to create loopholes and exceptions for punishments. 
Yet there may be some room for reasonable compromise on the 
issue of felon franchise.  Not all crimes are equal, and some crimes 
are more reprehensible and more likely to suggest 
                                                          
 137. Id. 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (2004). 
 139. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000). 
 140. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www. 
sentencingproject.org/issues_03.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); NAACP, Re-
Enfranchisement, ttp://www.naacp.org/programs/vote/vote_reenfranchiment. html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2005); Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Rights Restoration, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/dem_vr_fvr.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2005). 
 141. Clegg, supra note 81, at 176. 
 142. Id. at 177. 
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untrustworthiness.143  One can make a convincing case that someone 
who has committed a relatively minor crime and who has exhibited 
good behavior for an extended period of time upon the completion 
of his prison or parole term can request that his right to vote be 
restored.144  Indeed, the National Commission on Federal Election 
Reform—a bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel chaired by former Presidents 
Ford and Carter—has made a similar recommendation.145  The 
restoration of an ex-convict’s voting right should be done on a case-
by-case basis through an administrative mechanism because it would 
be difficult to draft a statute that draws a bright-line rule taking into 
account factors such as the seriousness of the crime, the potential for 
recidivism, and the number of prior offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Serving his sentence in an upstate New York prison for the murders 
of Patrolmen Piagentini and Waverly, Anthony Bottom issued a 
statement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of their deaths.  His 
statement began: “A month ago this very day some [twenty-five] years 
ago something happened that consequently directly impacted my 
life.”146  But nowhere in his statement did Bottom mention the 
patrolmen that he murdered.  Rather, the “something” that “directly 
impacted his life” was the death of political radical George Lester 
Jackson at the San Quentin prison.147  Bottom expressed no remorse 
for his crimes, and instead implied that he was a “political 
                                                          
 143. Id. at 174. 
 144. Id. 
 145.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 17, at 45 (emphasis 
added) (recommending disenfranchisement until felons have fully served their sen-
tences, including any term of probation or parole, or alternatively a lifetime disen-
franchisement that nonetheless permits a clemency-like mechanism for restoring the 
franchise, in “particular cases”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, 
Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, Sept. 2005, at 4.6.1, available at http:// 
www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf.  The Commission recommends 
that: 
States should allow for restoration of voting rights to otherwise eligible citi-
zens who have been convicted of a felony (other than for a capital crime or 
one which requires enrollment with an offender registry for sex crimes) once 
they have fully served their sentence, including any term of probation or pa-
role. 
Id. 
 146. See Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, August 1971, 25 Years Later, http://prisonactiist. 
org/pps+pows/jalil-muntaqim/August71.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) (stating 
that according to the website’s Editor’s Note: “(t)his statement was written by New 
African political prisoner Jalil Muntaqim—Anthony Jalil Bottom—for the September 
21, 1996 rally of the kNOw INJUSTICE Coalition, held at Dolores Park in San Fran-
cisco, 1996”). 
 147. Id. 
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prisoner.”148 
The people of New York, as well as forty-seven other states, have 
made their voices clear in support of laws that disenfranchise felons 
like Anthony Bottom.  As explained in this Article, neither the 
Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides plausible 
grounds to invalidate the felon disenfranchisement laws that are on 
the books today.  And it would be a crime to distort the Constitution 
or the intent of Congress to overturn the will of the people of forty-
eight states via judicial fiat. 
 
 
                                                          
 148. Id. 
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